Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Pure vs Mixed Strategy
A Pure Strategy is when a player picks one specific move and sticks to it.
Take a look at the classic Prisoner's Dilemma. In that game, the smartest move is a pure strategy ... both players usually end up choosing to "tell" on each other every single time because it's the safest bet.
But what happens when being predictable completely ruins your chances? That's where things get interesting. In those games our best move is to keep our opponent guessing by randomly choosing a mix of actions: a Mixed Strategy.
Rock-Paper-Scissors

Let's play rock-paper-scissors! There are three choices:
- Rock beats scissors
- Scissors beats paper
- Paper beats rock
If we both pick the same, we tie.
Any single choice (such as paper) can't win all the time.
So, how do you play to win?
If you pick rock too often, I will notice this and start picking paper. Then, you lose!
The solution is a Mixed Strategy
Don't pick the same move every time. Pick rock, paper, or scissors randomly.
This keeps you a mystery. I can't find a pattern to beat you.
Usually, you want to pick each about one-third of the time but people are a little predictable!
- New players often start with Rock (35%)
- Experienced players often start with Paper (35%)
- Scissors is least likely (30%)

John Nash
Nash Equilibrium
A brilliant mathematician named John Nash figured out a special concept called a Nash Equilibrium. It's a point in a game where no player can get a better score by changing their own strategy. It's like a stable standoff.
Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
Here's the good part: we can apply this stability to our random mixed strategies!
We want probabilities so each option gives the same expected result.
When this balance is reached, switching strategies won't improve the outcome. Any predictable change could be used by the opponent.
We call this balance a Mixed Strategy Equilibrium.
Worked Example: The Tennis Serve
In tennis, a server can serve Wide or down the T. The receiver must guess which way to lean. If the receiver guesses right, the server is less likely to win the point.
To find the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, the Server must choose a probability that makes the Receiver "indifferent" (meaning the Receiver gets the same result no matter what they choose).
Step 1: Assign Probabilities
- Let p be the probability the Server serves Wide
- Therefore, 1 − p is the probability the Server serves T
Step 2: Set the Receiver's Expected Payoffs to Equal
We look at the Receiver's win percentages (the second numbers in the table):
- If Receiver Leans Wide: 70p + 10(1 − p)
- If Receiver Leans T: 20p + 80(1 − p)
For equilibrium, we set these as equal:
70p + 10 − 10p = 20p + 80 − 80p
Step 3: Solve for p
- Simplify: 60p + 10 = 80 - 60p
- Add 60p to both sides: 120p + 10 = 80
- Subtract 10: 120p = 70
- Divide: p = 70/120 or 0.58
The Result: To be unpredictable and unexploitable, the Server should serve Wide 58% of the time and serve T 42% of the time.
If the Server uses this exact mix, the Receiver will win 45% of points regardless of whether they lean Wide or T. The Server has successfully protected their strategy!
Summary
- When no single choice is perfect, randomness can be the best strategy
- By using mixed strategies we aren't guessing: we are strategically choosing when to be unpredictable
- We want probabilities so each option gives the same expected result